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Three interrelated studies addressed the challenges facing the USN and its allies in Asia.  
(Two studies were dropped given labor and financial constraints.)  The aim of the first 
study is to evaluate Chinese views of maritime strategy to evaluate possible areas for 
cooperation, deterrence enhancement, and risk mitigation.  A second focuses on China’s 
expanding counterspace capabilities that threaten U.S. naval strategy Asia.  Analyzing the 
emerging threat environment, thinking through specific counter-measures, and 
developing allied strategies with East Asian military partners could strengthen deterrence, 
reduce vulnerabilities, and ensure operational effectiveness.  A final study looks at the 
dilemma of strengthening US-ROK deterrence while minimizing risks of conflict 
escalation in the maritime realm.  The context for this includes recent NK provocations, 






Perceptions of Maritime Strategy 
In Asia, Chinese development of a range of capabilities encapsulated in the A2/AD 
moniker has raised significant questions about the future of international security in the 
region.  Situated on top of a broader narrative of the “rise of China,”1 specific operational 
challenges to USN access to the region potentially raise questions about alliance 
commitment and the broader balance of power in the region.  In the context of the 
“rebalance” or “pivot” to Asia, the U.S. military is developing a range of responses as 
laid out in the JOAC and ASB.2  Deepened understanding of the nature of Chinese 
strategy is critical for the future developments in this regard. 
 
Implications of China’s Counterspace Developments 
China’s expanding counterspace capabilities raise serious concerns for the future of U.S. 
naval operations in the Sea of Japan, the South China Sea, and certain areas of the 
western Pacific.3  Some U.S. military officers, civilian officials, and academic analysts 
                                               
1 Friedberg, Aaron L. A Contest for Supremacy : China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia. 
New York; London: W.W. Norton, 2012.  Ashley A. J. Tellis, "Balancing Without Containment: A U.S. 
Strategy for Confronting China's Rise," The Washington Quarterly 36, no. 4 (October, 2013): 109-124.  
2 The JOAC paper is available here.  General Norton A. Schwartz and Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, "Air-
Sea Battle: Promoting Stability in An Era of Uncertainty," The American Interest (2012).  See the specifics 
in the various official sources cited in Appendix B of the China Naval Modernization (CRS report 3/23/12) 
and  Schwartz’s and Greenert’s comments at a Brookings forum, pp 14-17, inter alia. 
3 Ashley J. Tellis, “Does China Threaten the United States in Space?” testimony before the House Armed 
Services Subcommittees on Strategic Forces and on Seapower & Projection Forces, January 28, 2014. 
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believe that the Navy may “lose space” early in a future conflict with China.4  However, 
these scenarios assume a static U.S. response to China’s emergence in space, which is far 
from accurate.  Moreover, it assumes that the United States will fight alone, failing to 
consider the possible contribution of U.S. allies.  More work, including a mix of technical 
and policy analysis, on the nature and capabilities of comparative space networks is 
needed to assess the extent of U.S. vulnerabilities and to develop both tactics and a 
broader strategy for “fighting through” emerging challenges posed by China in space. 
 
Maritime Deterrence in the US-ROK Alliance  
Extended deterrence has girded the US-ROK defense relationship since establishment of 
the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty.  Throughout the Cold War, US nuclear weapons 
provided the “ultimate” deterrence guarantee.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union, US 
policy deemed extended deterrence robust enough that US tactical nuclear weapons could 
be withdrawn from the ROK.  Korean security conditions continued to evolve, however, 
most notably with the rise of Chinese regional influence and the growth of North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons capabilities.5  In 2010, North Korea’s sinking of the ROK navy’s 
Cheonan and artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island spotlighted the existing alliance 
posture’s insufficiency in deterring such “smaller-scale” aggressive actions.6  The 
alliance partners’ responses included formation of an Extended Deterrence Policy 
Committee (EDPC) to increase information sharing and develop “policy alternatives for 
deterring North Korean provocations.”7  Despite calls in some circles to redeploy US 
tactical nuclear weapons in the ROK,8 enhanced nuclear threat-making may lack the 
credibility to effectively deter smaller-scale aggression.  Enhanced conventional 
capabilities to defend against and/or respond to these contingencies may also provide 
more robust deterrence.  But broad-based conventional force enhancement also risks 
                                               
4 See, for example, Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin, “Space, China’s Tactical Frontier,” Journal of Strategic 
Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2011;  
5 For a recent evaluation of these developments, see Dongjin Jeong, “China’s Foreign Policy toward North 
Korea: The Nuclear Issue,” Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2012. 
6 See, for example, Richard C. Bush III, “The US Policy of Extended Deterrence in East Asia: History, 
Current Views and Implications,” Brookings Institution Arms Control Series, February 2011, 
<www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/02/arms-control-bush>; Paul J. Saunders, Extended Deterrence 
and Security in East Asia: A US-Japan-South Korea Dialogue, Center for the National Interest, January 
2012, <www.cftni.org/2012-Extended-Deterence-In-East-Asia.pdf>; and Jeffrey Lewis, “Extended Nuclear 
Deterrence in Northeast Asia,” Nautilus Institute Special Report, August 1, 2012, 
<http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/extended-nuclear-deterrence-in-northeast-asia/>; 
7 “S. Korea–U.S. to organize a joint committee for extending nuclear deterrence,” Hankyoreh, October 9, 
2010, <english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/443035.html>.  See also Cheon Seong Whun, 
“The Significance of Forming a ROK-US Extended Deterrence Policy Committee,” Korean Institute for 
National Reunification, November 3, 2010  <www.kinu.or.kr/upload/neoboard/DATA02/co10-
39(E)1.pdf>, p. 5; US Pacific Command, “Presence with a Purpose,” November 2011, 
<www.pacom.mil/about-uspacom/presence-with-a-purpose/201111.shtml>; and “S. Korea, U.S. agree to 
set N. Korean nuclear deterrence policy by 2014,” Yonhap News Agency, October 24, 2012, 
<english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/10/24/58/0301000000AEN20121024006651315F.HTML> . 
8 For an overview see Duyeon Kim, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Korea: A Temporary or Perennial 
Debate?” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, June 2011, 
<armscontrolcenter.org/issues/northkorea/articles/tactical_nuclear_weapons_and_korea/>.  See also Wade 
L. Huntley, “Speed Bump on the Road to Global Zero: US Nuclear Reductions and Extended Deterrence in 
East Asia," Nonproliferation Review 20 (July 2013), pp. 305-38. 
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widening pathways for rapid conflict escalation in the event of deterrence failure.  Thus, a 
fundamental challenge of the US-ROK alliance today is to strengthen credible and robust 
deterrence of smaller-scale aggression without eroding regional stability and increasing 
prospects of conflict escalation.  This project will evaluate the potential role of US & 
ROK maritime forces in resolving this dilemma. 
 
 
Findings and Conclusions (to include Process) 
  
Fighting through a degraded space environment in Asia 
Rather than blithely ignoring the problem or simply assuming the worst, the study 
examined adversarial counter-space capabilities challenging U.S. space superiority and 
identified mitigation measures that can be implemented with existing capabilities. These 
can improve resiliency of DoD space-enabled operations in contested environments in 
East Asia scenarios. The study was conducted by a team of students and faculty from the 
Space Systems and National Security Affairs departments at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, as part of the Naval Research Program (under OPNAV sponsorship). This study 
is part of a broader pol-mil project on East Asia that we are conducting in response to a 
request from C7F.  Further details are available subject to classification. 
  
China’s Maritime Strategy:  
In Chinese military writings, counter-intervention is not described as a general military 
strategy.  To be sure, China is developing new capabilities that could be used against the 
United States if it intervened in a regional conflict involving China.  Chinese sources to 
describe the need to “deal with” or “resist” intervention as a part of specific campaign, 
especially a conflict over Taiwan.  That is, China views dealing with the United States 
not as the primary goal of its military strategy, but as one component of a subset of 
possible scenarios it envisions. Once we recognize this, it becomes clear that China faces 
a range of security concerns, and that presuming it focuses narrowly or solely on the 
United States can lead to self-fulfilling prophecies and downward spirals 
 
US-ROK Alliance: 
The core deterrence problem on the Korean peninsula today is not that capabilities are 
insufficient, or that the will to use these capabilities in appropriate circumstances is 
particularly lacking.  Rather, the core problem is that threat of use of overwhelming force 
in response to lower-level aggression is not credible, because all sides know it would not 
be strategically appropriate.  Deterring a wide range of potential low-level aggressive acts 
therefore requires a broad array of conventional capabilities tailored for deterrence as 
well as defense across a range of threat scenarios.  Escalation concerns can be minimized 
by matching the deterrence capability to the aggression threat as closely as possible in 
both scale and kind.  Hence, ROK maritime forces should be a major element of a 
credible conventional deterrence posture, with focus on deterring maritime threats (as 
represented by the Cheonan sinking).  Additionally, broadening interaction between US 
and ROK maritime forces with respect to such roles can enhance both allies’ assurance 
that deterrence commitments will be upheld, projecting joint will and thereby bolstering 
the tailored deterrence posture.    
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Recommendations for Further Research 
 
In the space area, further work is warranted both on the broad pol mil options, but also on 
the narrow operational considerations.  Classification limits discussion, although 
encouraging a broad discussion about the higher level strategies remains important.  
Regarding China’s maritime strategy, charting the continuing evolution is an important 
goal, as well as further investigation of the interaction of that strategy with US 
capabilities and the prospects for spirals should be considered.  Finally, with respect to 
the role of ROK maritime forces in a tailored joint US-ROK deterrence posture, current 
results indicate three areas for deeper examination:  specifying threat contingencies for 
which ROK maritime forces are best suited to enhance deterrence credibility while 
minimizing escalation risks; determining appropriate degrees of specificity in declared 
joint deterrence postures; and examining the historical role of maritime collaboration as 
an assurance instrument in the US-ROK security relationship.   
